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Socrates and Superiority 
Nathan Hanna 
Abstract 
I propose a n  alternative interpretation of the Crito.  The arguments 
tha t  a re  typically taken to be Socrates’ primary arguments against 
escape are  actually supplementary arguments that  rely on what I call 
the Superiority Thesis, the thesis tha t  the s ta te  and i ts  citizens a re  
members of a moral hierarchy where those below are tied by bonds of 
obligation to those above. I provide evidence that  Socrates holds this 
thesis, demonstrate how it resolves a number of apparent difficulties, 
and  show why my interpretat ion is  preferable to  competing 
interpretations. 
Introduction 
Commentary on the Crito usually emphasizes two of i ts  
arguments: the argument from injury and the argument from 
agreement.l I argue tha t  standard interpretations of these 
arguments overlook the Socratic commitments they rely on and 
misunderstand the role they play in Socrates’ overall argument 
against escape. The arguments rely, not on relatively elaborate 
theories of law, political obligation, or agreement, but on the 
thesis that states and citizens are members of a moral hierarchy 
where states have a special, superior status in relation to  their 
citizens. This thesis-the Superiority Thesis-is the principal 
support for Socrates’ decision not to escape. The arguments 
from agreement and injury also rely on this thesis and, though 
valid, serve primarily as persuasive supplements to Socrates’ 
fundamental argument: an argument from superiority. 
I begin by listing five problems with the arguments of the 
Crito. Standard interpretations, I claim, fail t o  adequately 
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resolve these problems. I then extract the Superiority Thesis 
and the superiority argument from the text and show how they 
resolve these problems. In proposing this interpretation, I hope 
to stake out a middle ground between competing interpretations 
of the Crito and offer a more plausible understanding of the 
text and of Socrates’ moral and political philosophy. 
1. Five Problems 
The Crito presents readers with a variety of problems. I will 
deal with five. First, there is an apparent inconsistency between 
what Socrates says in the Apology and what he says in the 
Crito.’ In  the Apology Socrates declares his willingness t o  
disobey both s ta te  commands to commit injustice and s ta te  
commands that conflict with divine commands (Ap.  29d, 32a-e). 
But in the Crito the Laws claim that citizens have an uncondi- 
tional obligation to obey the state (Cr. 5 l b - ~ ) . ~  
The second problem has t o  do with injury. Socrates argues 
that citizens are obligated to obey the state because disobedience 
is injurious to the state and doing injury is wrong. But it looks 
like one could injure the s ta te  by disobeying the sorts of 
commands tha t  Socrates is willing to disobey. In certain 
situations, his principles may leave one with no choice but to do 
wrong. The most obvious example, presented hypothetically in 
the Apology,  is  a case where a s ta te  command and a divine 
command conflict. Obeying God would injure the s ta te  and 
obeying the state would mean disobeying God. 
The third problem involves the legitimacy of the state’s 
command. In partial response to Crito’s litany of considerations, 
Socrates dismisses as worthless the opinions of the many, 
arguing that only expert opinions merit consideration. Socrates’ 
lengthy discussion of the worthlessness of majority opinion (Cr. 
46e-48b) could be thought to call into question the legitimacy of 
the verdict against him. The verdict was issued by nonexpert 
jurors, many of whom came t o  their decision on the basis of 
prejudice rather than on the basis of the evidence-in violation 
of their oath (Cr. 35c-d). One might think Socrates’ views on the 
reliability of majority opinion give him reason t o  think tha t  
judicial verdicts issued under such conditions are not legitimate 
and therefore need not be obeyed. 
The fourth and fifth problems stem from the fact t ha t  
Socrates does not seem to say enough in support of his claims 
regarding obligation and injury. His claims about obligation give 
rise to the fourth problem. It  is not clear why the agreement 
between Socrates and the state has the terms Socrates claims it 
has. Why is it that by remaining in Athens anyone in Socrates’ 
position has thereby agreed to  do anything the state commands 
unless he can persuade i t  otherwise (Cr. 51e)? Even if one 
grants Socrates the existence of an  agreement, i t  is not clear 
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why Socrates has the specific obligations that he claims to have. 
Furthermore, the alleged existence of an agreement seems in 
tension with Socrates’ analogy between citizens and slaves. If 
citizens are like slaves, appeals to agreement seem out of place 
(Martin 1970). 
The fifth problem is that it is not clear how and why the state 
would suffer injury as a result of disobedience. Some commenta- 
tors attempt conceptual analyses of law and appeal to familiar 
considerations about i ts  universal applicability in  order to 
explain things (e.g., Allen 1972; Farrell 1978; Wade 1971), but 
there is little textual support for attributing such commitments 
to Socrates. The passage often thought to suggest something 
along these lines is at Cr. 50b. 
Do you imagine that a city can continue to exist and not be turned 
upside down, if the  legal judgments which a re  pronounced in  i t  
have no force but are nullified and destroyed by private persons? 
As a first step toward reinterpreting the Crito, I propose an  
alternative interpretation of this  crucial passage. Before 
offering my interpretation, however, I will consider a represen- 
tative sample of attempts to deal with some of the problems I 
have noted. The deficiencies of these interpretations are instruc- 
tive and will hopefully serve to motivate my own interpretation. 
2. Contemporary Theory and 
the Failure of Philosophy 
Perhaps the problem tha t  has given commentators the most 
persistent difficulty is the problem of inconsistency. How can 
Socrates’ willingness to disobey certain s ta te  commands be 
reconciled with his unqualified claims regarding citizens’ 
obligation of obedience to  the state? Commentators have also 
had an  abiding interest in his talk of injury and agreement, 
seeing in these remarks the seeds of contemporary theories of 
law and legal obligation. Much effort has been put into spelling 
out relatively sophisticated theories that  commentators think 
they see working in the background. These efforts, it is assumed, 
could not only enhance our understanding of the Crito, filling 
apparent gaps in the arguments and solving other problems, 
but might even address contemporary concerns about the nature 
and extent of our legal obligations, the permissibility of civil 
disobedience, and so on. 
Commentators have offered a variety of interpretations of 
the Crito. Faced with the persistent difficulties and the insuffi- 
ciency of standard interpretations, some have even denied that 
the speech of the Laws (the content of which bears primary 
responsibility for the problems above) reflect Socrates’ commit- 
ments and contain his own arguments (see, e.g., Brown 1992; 
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Congleton 1974; Miller 1996; Young 1974; Weiss 1998). Because 
the Laws place so much emphasis on obedience and apparently 
opt for oratorical flair a t  the expense of valid argument, their 
speech seems strongly at odds with Socrates’ commitment to 
philosophy. Focusing on the dramatic and literary characteristics 
of the dialogue, these commentators suggest that  the speech of 
the Laws is meant to take up a task of persuasion, a task that 
Socrates and philosophy have been unable to achieve. Socrates 
tr ies but fails to persuade the unphilosophical Crito with 
philosophical arguments. Rather than  leaving Crito in  the  
lurch, however, Socrates turns  things over to the Laws, who 
successfully persuade Crito by means of the oratory to which he 
is accustomed. The speech of the Laws is a dramatic device, but 
it is also, on this interpretation, a means of distancing Socrates 
from the means used t o  persuade Crito, who s tands as an  
exemplar of the unphilosophical many. 
This interpretation is right to stress the persuasive and 
dramatic character of the Laws’ speech, but many find it too 
quick to dismiss the speech as unsocratic. Why would Socrates 
abandon his commitment to  philosophical inquiry and opt for 
oratory in an  attempt to persuade Crito? Socrates, after all, 
consistently expresses distaste for unphilosophical appeals to 
emotion (e.g., Ap. 17a-c, 35c, 38d-39a; Cr. 50b-c) and throughout 
the early dialogues exhibits a n  untiring commitment t o  
philosophical argument in the face of comparable, if not greater, 
intellectual opacity, not to mention outright hostility-one 
reason why he was put on trial (Ap. 21d-24b; Cr. 21e-24b; see 
also Euth. 7c-d). The interpretation, it seems, comes at a rather 
high cost. 
McLaughlin argues that initial preference should be given to 
the Socratic interpretation: “only after every attempt to  give a 
Socratic interpretation has failed should we conclude that the 
words of the Laws, which Socrates admits to generally approving, 
are in fact unsocratic” (McLaughlin 1976, 189). I offer a Socratic 
interpretation that should have some attractions for proponents 
of the unsocratic interpretation. Before getting to  my interpre- 
tation, however, I want to discuss a couple of mainstream, 
rather well-known Socratic interpretations offered by Allen 
(1972) and Vlastos (1974). 
Allen tries to  explain why escape implies injury. The “key,” 
he says, lies in “the nature of judicial authority’’ (Allen 1972, 
564). On this interpretation, Socrates holds that escaping would 
be tantamount t o  denying the legitimacy or authority of the 
judicial verdict against him. Denying the authority of the 
verdict would be to deny the authority of any verdict. But that  
would ultimately deny the authority of the law itself since it 
would deny authority to the application of the law. “Since the 
application of law is essential to the existence of law, to act in 
breach of a given application is-by so much-destructive of 
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law” (ibid.). This is how Allen interprets Cr.  50b. Since a city 
cannot exist without law and law is nothing without application, 
disobeying the judicial decision is destructive of both the law 
and the city. This, Allen says, “is essentially a universalization 
argument” (ibid.). Socrates is working with a principle of legal 
universalization. Combining this with the principle that it is 
wrong to do injury, Socrates concludes that  escape would be 
wrong. 
As for the possibility tha t  a law or  judicial verdict might 
obligate Socrates to commit injustice, Allen avoids this problem 
by claiming that “authority extends only so  far as agreement 
binds” (ibid., 565). He thinks that disobeying a state command 
to commit injustice is not injurious because such commands are 
not authorized by the agreement between Socrates and the 
state. The argument from agreement, he claims, “does not serve 
as an independent ground for refusing to escape: it is rather an 
essential link in a concatenated argument which rests on the 
primacy of justice” (ibid., 563). According to Allen, Socrates 
holds that the existence of an agreement is not the sole grounds 
for the justice of abiding by it, rather “the justice of abiding by 
it is a condition for honoring” it (ibid.). Considerations of justice 
serve as Socrates’ fundamental rationale against escape. Hence, 
the agreement cannot generate an obligation to commit injustice. 
Attributing a universalization principle to Socrates is quite 
speculative and speculation of this sort seems rather undesirable. 
The text simply does not suggest that  Socrates holds such a 
principle. Even if we set the speculation aside, however, there is 
a significant problem with Allen’s interpretation. He says that 
doing injury “is treated as a direct implication of the proposition 
that one is never to do injustice” (ibid., 563). But if the univer- 
salization principle applies to laws and judicial verdicts that  
command the commission of injustice-and Allen gives us no 
reason to think that it does not (quite the opposite actually)- 
then it looks like disobeying such laws or  verdicts injures the 
state. Agreement seems irrelevant to this problem since it can 
be generated simply with Allen’s claims about the nature of 
laws and judicial decisions. Since justice requires that one must 
never inflict injury, it looks like one is obligated and not obligated 
to obey laws and judicial decisions that command unjust action. 
Allen’s attempt to  resolve the first, fourth, and fifth problems 
fails to resolve the second problem. 
Vlastos takes a different approach. Worried primarily about 
the problem of inconsistency, he focuses on the argument from 
agreement, elaborating at length on the nature  of a tacit 
agreement-a concept he explicitly, and rather speculatively, 
attr ibutes t o  Socrates (Vlastos 1974, 525). He also strongly 
emphasizes considerations of gratitude, claiming that Socrates 
held that  receipt of benefits generates obligations of “special 
forbearance” (ibid., 520) that require one to sacrifice and take 
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risks to spare one’s benefactors injury. Such obligations, however, 
do not require one t o  do jus t  anything on behalf of one’s 
benefactors. “Collisions between duties” (ibid., 530) will some- 
times require that one violate the law, as Socrates recognizes in 
the first book of the Republic and affirms with his professed 
willingness to disobey. Socrates, Vlastos concludes, is just being 
careless when he says tha t  citizens have a n  unconditional 
obligation to  obey the state. Vlastos resolves the inconsistency 
by taking the speech of the Laws t o  involve a bit of careless 
exaggeration. 
Like Allen, Vlastos seems to see Socrates’ argument as 
committed first and foremost to justice. Agreements will 
generate obligations only if those agreements accord with 
justice (ibid., 527). By accepting the benefits the legal order of 
Athens affords i ts  citizens, Socrates has  entered into a n  
agreement and incurred an obligation of obedience. This duty 
springs from a rather sophisticated theory of legal obligation. 
Surprisingly, Vlastos attributes to Socrates a theory of legal 
obligation that looks identical t o  the fair play theory of legal 
obligation proposed by Hart (1955) and Rawls (1964). 
The legal order of Athens is an association which produces for all 
of its citizens great benefits of individual security, welfare, and 
culture. Law-obedience is the form in which every citizen pays his 
dues t o  the collective enterprise. By exercising the rights of 
citizenship in a state like Athens, he gives his fellows to  under- 
stand that he agrees to carry his individual share of the aggregate 
burden, undertakes in all fairness to do his part, as he expects 
them to do theirs. (Vlastos 1974, 528) 
I quote at such length to make a point. I t  seems highly specula- 
tive-speculative to the point of implausibility-to attribute 
such an elaborate theory of legal obligation to Socrates. Insofar 
as Vlastos does this he fails to adequately resolve the fourth 
and fifth problems. Such speculation simply projects contem- 
porary views on the text. It provides no insight on what the text 
reveals about Socratic commitments. Nowhere does the text 
remotely suggest that  Socrates is working with this theory in 
mind. 
Granted, Vlastos admits tha t  Socrates did not spell this 
argument out and claims only that Socrates had “an intuitive 
sense of it” (ibid., 527), but an attempt to explicate, on the basis 
of fragmentary remarks, what Socrates had an intuitive sense 
of requires caution. The fact that  the Laws say that they have 
benefited citizens (Cr. 51c) and their analogy between themselves 
and parents hardly suggests, as  Vlastos thinks they do, tha t  
Socrates intuitively grasps and is on some level working with 
the fair play theory of legal obligation. The same goes for  
Vlastos’s theory of tacit consent. 
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The unsocratic interpretation, as McLaughlin suggests, 
should be rejected until every reasonable attempt to give a 
Socratic interpretation has failed. But Socratic interpretations 
like the ones Allen and Vlastos give should, I think, also be 
rejected unless less speculative Socratic interpretations fail. I 
propose a less speculative Socratic account that  resolves the 
problems that alternative Socratic interpretations have been 
unable to  cope with and that more plausibly frames the relevant 
arguments within Socrates’ overall argument against escape. 
3. Moral Hierarchy 
Let us return t o  Cr .  50b. One might think that the passage 
expresses some elaborate theory of law or  legal obligation. 
Allen, as we saw, says that there is a universalization argument 
here. I will try to  avoid this sort of speculation. 
Throughout the Crito and the Apology, Socrates consistently 
expresses a concern, not so much for law in particular, but more 
generally for the state’s relationship with-primarily i ts  
superior s ta tus  with respect to-its citizens. An accurate 
interpretation of the Crito must begin with this fact in mind. 
Socrates’ concern for the law stems from his more general con- 
cerns regarding the nature of the relationship between states 
and citizens. The particular law and the particular judicial 
decision a t  issue in the Crito are being discussed under the 
umbrella of a theory about the relative moral standing of 
citizens, states, and God (among others), not a theory about the 
law in particular. 
I will set aside the passage’s talk of the destruction of the 
law for a moment and focus on something else. The passage 
hints a t  something about the relationship between the state 
and “private persons.” In explicitly mentioning private persons 
as it does, the passage reflects a thesis about the relationship 
between citizens and the state-that it is a relationship between 
unequal parties, between parties with different moral standing. 
A few lines below, Socrates argues for this thesis by drawing 
analogies between the state, parents, and masters. 
From Cr. 50e-51c the Laws discuss at  length the nature of 
their relationship with citizens. Citizens are compared with 
children and slaves. They are said to  have a different moral 
standing than the state and its laws: “do you imagine that what 
is right for us is equally right for you?” (Cr .  50e). They are said 
to have an inequality of rights with the state and the Laws just 
as they have an inequality of rights with their parents: “You 
[do] not have equality of rights” (ibid.) These inequalities are 
even more pronounced between citizen and state than they are 
between child and parent-so much so that  the analogy is 
extended and the relationship between state and citizen is 
compared to that between master and slave. Socrates sums 
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things up with a remark that demonstrates that  his concerns 
extend beyond the law. 
Both in war and in the law courts and everywhere else you must do 
whatever your city and your country command, or else persuade 
them in accordance with universal justice. (Cr.  51b-c, emphasis 
added) 
This infamous passage reflects a concern, not just with law, but 
with all kinds of state commands: laws, judicial verdicts, superior 
officers’ orders, and so There is an apparent authoritarian 
streak here, seemingly inconsistent with what Socrates says 
elsewhere, but focusing on the apparent authoritarianism of the 
passage can lead one to overlook what i t  reflects about the 
generality of Socrates’ concerns. His concerns extend beyond the 
law to  the source of the laws’ legitimacy and ultimately to  the 
source of citizens’ obligations to the state. 
Socrates is concerned with more than just law. This should 
be obvious enough. What may not be so obvious is the fact that  
he says a lot to suggest that he is working with a general theory 
about the relative moral standing of citizens, states, God, and 
others. This theory informs his views on the obligations that  
citizens have t o  the state. Consider some passages from the 
Apology. 
I do know tha t  to do wrong and to disobey my superior, whether 
God or man, is wicked and dishonorable. (Ap. 29b, emphasis added) 
Gentlemen, I am your very grateful and devoted servant, but I owe 
a greater obedience to God than to you. (Ap.  29d, emphasis added) 
These passages illustrate two significant elements of Socrates’ 
view: there are unequal relationships between different types of 
entities and there are entities that are superior to the state, for 
example, God, toward whom citizens have more pressing 
obligations of obedience. Considered jointly, the Crito and the 
Apology reflect a commitment to a moral hierarchy where those 
below are tied by bonds of obligation t o  those above (Martin 
1970, 36; Wade 1971, 323).5 Socrates clearly sets things out: at 
the top is God, next the state, next parents, then the citizen.6 
Nearer the bottom are  women, children, and slaves (all are  
mentioned in unflattering similes throughout the dialogues). 
There is nothing new in attributing any of this t o  Socrates. 
What is new is the role I claim these commitments play in his 
overall argument against escape and how the arguments from 
injury and agreement fit into this framework. 
Socrates holds that a citizen’s obligations to  the state stem 
from the special relationship tha t  s ta tes  have with their  
citizens, analogous to the relationships between parents and 
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their children and masters and their slaves. To put it simply, 
the state is Socrates’ superior, in relevant respect much like his 
parent or master, and Socrates is therefore obligated to obey the 
state. This is Socrates’ fundamental argument against escape- 
the argument from superiority. There is no substantive theory 
of law or modern theory of political obligation at work in the 
Crito and the Apology, only a view about the relative moral 
standing of certain entities and the obligations they have to one 
another. I argue that the arguments from injury and agreement 
a re  in  fact supplementary arguments t ha t  also rely on the 
Superiority Thesis and tha t  serve primarily as persuasive 
supplements to  the argument from superiority. First, though, I 
want to show how appealing to  the argument from superiority 
solves the problems with which I began. 
4. Resolving the Problem 
of Inconsistency 
I have now outlined the basics of my interpretation. This 
interpretation is preferable to standard ones because it resolves, 
with minimal speculation, the five problems with which I 
began: Socrates seems to make inconsistent statements, there 
seems the possibility of injuring the state even when disobeying 
only the sorts of commands that Socrates is willing to  disobey, 
there is no account of why the jurors’ faulty decision generates 
a legitimate command, and there is insufficient basis both for 
Socrates’ claim to have the specific obligations that he thinks he 
has  and for his claim of injury. I consider the problem of 
inconsistency in this section and leave the remaining problems 
for the next. 
Socrates openly admits his willingness to disobey two kinds 
of state commands: commands to commit injustice and commands 
that conflict with divine commands. Yet he also seems to claim 
at Cr .  51b-c that citizens have an unconditional obligation to 
obey the state.  Some commentators t ry  to reconcile this  
apparent inconsistency by pointing to the distinction between 
doing injustice and suffering injustice and claiming that  the 
agreement between citizens and the state requires only the 
latter (e.g., Allen 1972, 566; McLaughlin 1976, 191; Vlastos 
1974, 527; Wade 1971, 324). Since Socrates holds that one must 
never commit injustice, the interpretation goes, he cannot 
consistently hold tha t  his agreement with the s ta te  might 
require him to commit injustice. As he holds no corresponding 
principle regarding the suffering of injustice, however, the 
agreement can require that he suffer injustice. Hence, commands 
to commit injustice are not covered by the agreement and can 
be disobeyed. The passage at Cr .  51b-c is simply interpreted- 
and partially dismissed-as a piece of “inflated rhetoric” 
(Vlastos 1974, 534). 
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This interpretation gets some things right. The agreement 
between Socrates and the state does not require him to commit 
injustice. But the interpretation overemphasizes the importance 
of agreement, taking agreement to be a significant source of 
obligation to  the state, and ignores Socrates’ views on the rela- 
tive moral standing of states, citizens, and God. It  zeroes in on 
the distinction between doing and suffering injustice with the 
sole aim of making Socrates consistent and gives an  unsatis- 
fying account of why citizens can be obligated to suffer injustice. 
In short, it  fails t o  accurately capture what Socrates thinks 
justice, in large part, consists in. Because the interpretation 
does not correctly identify the source of Socrates’ obligation of 
obedience, it  fails to  resolve certain problems, for example, the 
second and fourth problems. 
Allen, as we saw, tries to avoid this result by claiming that 
agreement limits the scope of authority. He thinks that disobey- 
ing a state command to commit injustice is not injurious because 
such commands are not authorized by the agreement. Here the 
interpretation reaches i ts  limit. I t  is mistaken to claim tha t  
Socrates thinks that agreement determines the extent of citizens’ 
obligations to the state. This suggests a more modern view that 
agreement is somehow involved in generating political obliga- 
tion, justice being merely a restriction on the sorts of obliga- 
tions tha t  agreement can generate. Such an  interpretation 
overlooks Socrates’ analogies. Agreement does not define the 
extent of obligation in the relationships between parents and 
children, masters and slaves, or God and human beings, so why 
would Socrates think that agreement determines the extent of 
citizens’ obligations toward the state, given the comparisons he 
makes? 
Socrates does not think tha t  agreement determines the 
extent of citizens’ obligations towards the state. He thinks that 
certain entities are  superior to others, tha t  the la t ter  have 
certain general obligations of obedience toward the former and 
tha t ,  other things being equal, disobeying one’s superior is  
wrong-agreement or  no agreement. Other things are  equal 
when the demands of a superior accord with the demands of 
justice. The demands of justice are the only limitation on the 
obligations generated by unequal moral standing. 
The apparent inconsistency is resolved as follows. Socrates 
holds that  when the demands of one’s superiors conflict, one 
must yield to the greater superior so long as i t  does not com- 
mand one to commit injustice. Both the citizen and the lesser 
superior have obligations of obedience toward the greater 
superior. Other things being equal, then, one must act in accor- 
dance with divine commands when they conflict with s ta te  
commands. Hence, Socrates can consistently refuse to  obey the 
s ta te  when i t  commands him t o  act contrary to a divine 
command. 
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When commands conflict with preexisting demands of 
justice, for example when the state commands one to commit 
injustice, one must act in accordance with justice. Justice places 
certain limits on the legitimacy of state commands, but, given 
the superiority of the state,  s ta te  commands also influence 
justice to  some extent. The commands of superiors can make it 
unjust to  do something that would otherwise not be unjust, but 
they cannot make it just to do something that is independently 
unjust. Read in context, Cr.  51b-c is consistent with this inter- 
pretation. The commands Socrates discusses require submission 
t o  punishments, risking one’s life in war and similar acts of 
personal sacrifice, not unjust acts. Cr.  51b-c need not be inter- 
preted as  a hyperbolic, careless passage, but one where the 
scope of the universal quantifier is implicitly restricted both by 
the requirement never to  commit injustice and by the context, 
which emphasizes obligations of personal sacrifice on the part 
of citizens in service t o  the state-obligations generated by 
their inferior position in the moral hierarchy. 
To paraphrase Wade, the Superiority Thesis “underlies all 
the reasoning of the Crito and the Apology” (Wade 1971,323). I t  
holds the key t o  a n  adequate resolution of the problem of 
inconsistency as well as the other problems I listed a t  the 
outset and allows us to properly frame the arguments that are 
typically taken to be Socrates’ primary arguments against 
escape. The relationship between obligation and justice that  
Socrates’ moral hierarchy involves, though often overlooked, 
bring the seemingly divergent arguments and s t rands of 
thought in the Crito together to  form a coherent whole. I will 
now consider the remaining problems and then go on t o  show 
what role the arguments from injury and agreement play in 
Socrates’ overall argument against escape. 
5. The Remaining Problems 
The second problem can be resolved fairly quickly. The second 
problem is the possibility of injuring the state by disobeying 
s ta te  commands to commit injustice. Many interpretations 
engage in a good deal of speculation, depart significantly from 
the text, and ultimately cannot resolve this problem. But the 
Superiority Thesis offers an  obvious out: in obeying a divine 
command that conflicts with a state command, Socrates would 
not be injuring the s ta te  a t  all, for he would be obeying a 
superior greater than the state.7 If the state suffers injury i t  
would be suffering at  its own hands by having acted contrary to  
divine command, that is, contrary to  the will of a superior. 
The third problem is the questionable legitimacy of a judicial 
decision rendered according t o  (worthless) majority opinion. 
Standard interpretations tend to ignore this problem, perhaps 
because i t  is assumed tha t  the arguments from injury and 
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agreement address it. Given the way standard interpretations 
take these arguments, however, this is not the case. The argu- 
ment from injury offers no help because it does not establish 
legitimacy. Legitimacy is usually taken to be a necessary 
condition for injury: “injury arises only from breach of authority” 
(Allen 1972, 565). 
But the argument from agreement does not seem helpful 
either. If considerations of justice constrain what can legiti- 
mately be agreed to, then the unjust tendencies of majority 
decisions may not make them suitable candidates for binding 
agreement. What we need to ask, I think, is what Socrates thinks 
justice consists in. Commentators tend to work with a relatively 
underspecified account, taking the relevant principles of justice 
to be the one forbidding injury and the one enjoining adherence 
to one’s agreements. Neither of these is sufficient here. Socrates, 
I think, has to appeal to the Superiority Thesis and the obliga- 
tion to  obey one’s superiors. The need for this appeal, given the 
inability of the arguments from injury and agreement to solve 
this and the other problems, leads me to conclude that the state’s 
superior moral standing actually precedes the agreement. 
Though it may seem paradoxical to contemporary readers, I will 
argue that the agreement is a product of the state’s superiority 
and of the related general obligation of obedience citizens have to 
the state-not a source of them. 
Appealing to the Superiority Thesis immediately solves the 
third problem because it simply renders the state’s use of non- 
expert jurors appropriate. The state has the moral standing to 
use this sort of method and even if there are  more reliable 
methods, the state can legitimately use this method in virtue of 
its superior status. The method may err, but state commands 
based on it are no less legitimate. 
Now for the fourth and fifth problems: the nature of the 
agreement and the grounds of injury. When it comes to injury, 
s tandard interpretations deviate from the text, speculate 
significantly, and so fail t o  offer an adequate account of injury. 
As for agreement, s tandard interpretations also engage in  
significant speculation, fail t o  explain why Socrates has the 
obligations he thinks he has, and leave the tension between his 
talk of agreement and his citizen-slave analogy intact. 
I will deal with the agreement problem first. The Superiority 
Thesis licenses a literal reading of Cr. 51e. 
If any one of you s tands his ground when he can see how we 
administer justice and the rest of our public organization, we hold 
that by so doing he has in fact undertaken to do anything that we 
tell him. (Cr.  51e, emphasis added) 
From its superior position the state generously deigns to  give 
citizens a choice: they can either leave o r  agree to abide by 
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state commands. The state is not arguing for the existence of an 
agreement here-it is pointing out the fact that  it  has created 
one, with terms it has laid down. The agreement is a product of 
the state’s superiority and of citizens’ obligations of obedience to 
the state, not a source of them. The state is entitled to be stricter 
(states that  do not allow their citizens to leave would not be 
parties to such agreements, however), but it exercises a measure 
of restraint by engaging citizens in an agreement and soliciting 
their consent. Because citizens are inferior to the state they 
have no say over the terms of the agreement, but none of this 
means tha t  they cannot enter into one (cf. Martin 1970, 36). 
Because they are given a choice, citizens can properly be said to 
agree to the state’s terms. 
The problem of injury is more complicated. Simply claiming 
that disobeying legitimate commands is injurious would render 
disobedience of divine commands injurious to God-presumably 
an  intolerable consequence for Socrates (cf. Wade 1971, 319). 
But an  account that  omits any reference to the legitimacy of 
commands might render defiance of illegitimate commands 
injurious-another unpalatable result. So the problem calls for 
some finesse. 
I suggest tha t  Socrates is thinking as follows: much of a 
state’s power rests upon its perceived legitimacy (one reason, 
perhaps, why the speech of the Laws has such a rhetorical 
flair), and a state cannot continue to  survive without its power. 
Anything tha t  undermines the appearance of the state’s 
legitimacy, anything that undermines reverence of the state and 
the law, injures the state because it undermines the foundations 
of its power-power the state is entitled to  have because of its 
superiority. Defiance of a direct command is particularly 
injurious because it sets a bad example, encouraging defiance 
on the part of others and lowering the state in the eyes of its 
citizens. The injury can perhaps be plausibly compared t o  an  
attack on someone’s reputation-defiance of a direct s ta te  
command in effect challenges or  denies the state’s superior 
moral standing. Unlike standard interpretations, which cast 
Socrates’ talk of injury in terms of unrealistic hypotheticals or 
conditionals or in terms of strained metaphors, this interpre- 
tation takes the charges of injury literally. 
My alternative interpretation yields a relatively clean solu- 
tion of the five problems at  minimal cost. Though the arguments 
as  interpreted are not plausible t o  the contemporary reader, 
they are  a t  least  consistent. Little has  been attr ibuted to 
Socrates that  does not have some apparent textual support. 
Rather than inappropriately attributing modern, relatively 
elaborate theories to  him, my interpretation offers something 
more in line with his remarks in the Crito and the Apology. 
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6. Consequences and Characteristics 
of the Interpretation 
One crucial consequence of my interpretation, given its emphasis 
on obedience to superiors, is that  it  renders Socrates’ account 
more authoritarian than many commentators think (e.g., Kraut 
1984; Weiss 1998). On my interpretation, the relative permis- 
siveness of the Athenian state does little more than soften the 
blow to antiauthoritarian sensibilities. Socrates’ remarks about 
persuading the state help to motivate his arguments, but they 
are not relevant parts of any argument. Athens is entitled to be 
stricter; the fact that  i t  is not may generate more admiration 
and reverence, and may strengthen the emotional appeal of the 
Laws’ speech, but it does little more than reinforce an indepen- 
dently established obligation of obedience. That obligation 
stems from the state’s superiority. Modern readers may be 
averse to such a claim, but we should be careful not to let our 
argumentative preferences adversely influence the interpretive 
project. 
Another consequence of my interpretation is that  i t  takes 
the arguments from injury and agreement to be supplementary 
arguments. Socrates’ fundamental argument against escape is 
a n  argument from superiority. That argument relies on the 
wrongfulness of disobeying a superior and on the superiority of 
s ta tes  t o  their  citizens. But Socrates sees tha t  other valid, 
though perhaps more persuasive, arguments can be given that 
rest on the same basic claims. The arguments from injury and 
agreement do not generate the obligation to obey the state. At 
best, they seem to reinforce a preexisting obligation. The obliga- 
tion to obey one’s superiors plays a fundamental role. Without 
it, Socrates’ claims regarding injury and agreement would be 
less secure, perhaps unfounded. 
The supplementary, persuasive nature of the arguments 
from injury and agreement do not render them any less 
important to the dialogue, however. The unsocratic interpre- 
tation, I think, is correct to  stress the dramatic nature of the 
Crito and its evident concern with persuasion. The Crito, after 
all, is unique among the Platonic dialogues in tha t  Socrates 
turns things over to an apparent mouthpiece-the Laws-to do 
his arguing for him. It  is mistaken, however, to assume that the 
Laws and Socrates are at odds so long as there is a reasonable 
interpretation that can reconcile the two. The use of the person- 
ified Laws and their obvious concern with persuasion is not 
evidence that Socrates wanted to distance himself from what 
they say (or that  Plato wanted to  distance Socrates from what 
they say); rather, i t  is  perfectly understandable given the  
circumstances of the dialogue. There is a way for proponents of 
the Socratic interpretation to account for the dialogue’s unique 
characteristics. 
264 
Socrates and Superiority 
If Socrates has failed to persuade someone, as the unsocratic 
interpretation holds, it is not Crito but, rather, the people of 
Athens, whose prejudice toward him he was unable to overcome 
with his defense. The speech of the Laws puts Socrates’ argu- 
ments on display, temporarily freed from any displeasing asso- 
ciation with him, any distracting hint of immorality, arrogance, 
or self-indulgence, and powerfully drives home to the reader the 
injustice of the verdict and the moral carelessness and ignor- 
ance of the many who rendered it. As the Laws tell Socrates: 
“you will leave this place, when you do, as the victim of a wrong 
done not by us, the laws, but by your fellow men” (Cr .  54b-c). 
When the Laws say this, they are not pointing out something 
relevant to the various arguments for obedience but, rather, 
emphasizing tha t  i t  was the people of Athens who unjustly 
convicted Socrates. They are doing what Socrates always did: 
pointing out people’s mistakes, moral failings, and intellectual 
shortcomings and trying to motivate people toward reflection 
and self-examination. Most importantly, perhaps, they a re  
calling on people to  exercise political and moral responsibility- 
t o  respect the law by obeying i t ,  to morally evaluate the law 
and work t o  change i t  by means of rational argument when 
they find it lacking, and to  justly apply it. 
The speech of the Laws is a dramatic device, but also a 
philosophical one. I t  is meant to persuade but also to achieve 
objectivity. The arguments the Laws give are meant to  persuade, 
but to  persuade in a certain kind of way-through valid argu- 
ment aimed at  revealing the truth and guiding conduct for the 
better. As Allen (1972) correctly observes, the Crito embodies 
Socrates’ vision of philosophical rhetoric-a powerfully 
convincing yet philosophically respectable mode of argument. 
Conclusion 
By accounting for Socrates’ views on the hierarchical relation- 
ship between the relevant entities and properly framing the 
arguments from injury and agreement within this under- 
standing, my interpretation solves the persistent difficulties 
commentators have encountered in trying to reconcile Socrates’ 
claims with the speech of the Laws and provides a fuller 
account of Socrates’ political and moral commitments. I t  also 
stakes out an attractive middle ground between Socratic and 
unsocratic interpretations. These characteristics, I think, make 
it preferable to alternative interpretations. 
Perhaps readers are inclined to dismiss this as just another 
ill-conceived interpretation that gives too much credit to  a text 
lacking in argumentative sophistication. Most readers are likely 
to  acknowledge that something akin to the Superiority Thesis 
is  working in the background, a t  the very least influencing 
Socrates’ thought. Such a claim seems almost trivial given his 
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talk of superiority. I have pressed a stronger claim however: 
that  Socrates intentionally grounds the arguments from injury 
and agreement in the Superiority Thesis. In doing this I risk 
inviting the charge that I am naively assuming a greater unity 
and clarity of thought than is merited given the oratorical flair 
of the Apology and the Crito. But I think Socrates says enough 
to support the claim that he is actively working with this thesis. 
If forced to choose, I would be more likely to  abandon the chari- 
table stance that Socrates’ arguments are coherent than I would 
be to abandon the claim that the Superiority Thesis underlies 
much of his thought. At the very least, I hope I have managed 
t o  establish that  focusing exclusively on the arguments from 
injury and agreement overlooks a crucial theme and substan- 
tially limits our understanding of the Crito and of Socrates’ 
moral and political philosophy.* 
Notes 
Many, including Allen (1972) and Farrell (1978)’ see these as the 
two primary arguments  against  escape. Some identify more argu- 
ments, however. Martin (1970) identifies three: the  two mentioned 
above as well as what he calls an  argument from piety involving the 
analogies between states, parents, and masters. Young adds to these 
three a n  argument based on the  “effects of Socrates’ flight” (Young 
1974, 12-13), including t h e  r isks  h is  f r iends would r u n ,  such as 
banishment and loss of property. Vlastos (1974), Walker (19881, and 
Woozley (1979), among others, identify a n  argument from gratitude. 
Vlastos takes this argument and the argument from agreement to be 
the two primary arguments against escape. Later (in note 4) I argue 
that,  if Socrates does make an  argument from gratitude, it should be 
taken as  a supplementary argument. On my interpretation, Socrates 
talks of benefits partly in order to establish the state-parent analogy, 
a n  analogy he uses to ground a n  argument much like the argument 
from piety: the argument from superiority. 
Many of the problems I deal with in this section stem from the  
speech of the Laws. For simplicity’s sake, I will, in this section, simply 
a t t r ibu te  everything t h e  Laws say  to Socrates.  There a r e  some 
interpretive complications that I will deal with later, however. 
This is perhaps the most widely noted problem. Commentators 
have put  a great  deal of effort into resolving t h e  apparent  incon- 
sistency. See, among many others,  Allen (1972),  Bostock (19901, 
Brickhouse and Smith (1984), and Vlastos (1974). 
4 T h e  surrounding text  is sometimes taken  to be pressing a n  
argument  from grat i tude (see note 1).  Given t h e  Laws’ claim t h a t  
Socrates’ escape would wrong his “guardians” (Cr .  51e), and the  fact 
t h a t  they go out  of their  way to distinguish th i s  from t h e  wrong 
Socrates would do by disobeying h is  parents  and  violating his  
agreement, i t  seems plausible to take their  appeal to benefits to be 
speaking against escape. Considerations of reciprocity may, as  Vlastos 
suggests, be relevant. But it is unlikely that  these considerations can 
do much to secure all the  obligations t h a t  Socrates claims to have. 
There is another aspect of the appeal to benefits that  should be noted. 
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The Laws tell Socrates: “since you have been born and brought up and 
educated, can you deny, in the first place, that  you were our child and 
servant, both you and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you imagine 
that what is right for us is equally right for you, and that whatever we 
t r y  to do to you, you a r e  justif ied in  retaliating?” ( C r .  50e). This  
passage suggests t h a t  reference to benefits is being used i n  a n  
argument  from analogy whose conclusion is  t h a t  t h e  relationship 
between citizen and  s t a t e  is morally l ike t h a t  between child and  
parent .  This  conclusion then  licenses t h e  claim t h a t  a citizen’s 
obligations to the state are like those of a child to his parent. Nowhere 
is it suggested t h a t  obligations to one’s parents  a r e  based funda- 
mentally on receipt of benefits and considerations of reciprocity. The 
obligations are rooted in the fact that  these are relationships between 
unequal parties. If Socrates does make a n  argument from gratitude, 
appealing to considerations of reciprocity in order to reveal obligations, 
such an  argument seems merely to reinforce obligations derived from 
the Superiority Thesis and the  argument from superiority. An argu- 
ment from gratitude would also, then, be a supplementary one. 
Martin recognizes tha t  Socrates’ analogy between the s ta te  and 
one’s master has  hierarchical implications, but he  mentions this  to 
reinforce the problem of inconsistency, using the Laws’ commitment to 
hierarchy to show how at odds their speech is with Socrates’ willing- 
ness to disobey. Wade, on t h e  other  hand ,  says t h a t  t h e  implied 
hierarchy strengthens the arguments from agreement and injury but 
he  does little to show exactly how it does this. In  fact, he  begins by 
offering a standard interpretation involving conceptual analyses of law 
to make sense of the argument from injury (Wade 1971, 314-16). His 
appeal to hierarchy is almost a n  afterthought. I try to explain things 
more fully, dispensing as far as possible with speculation and putting 
the hierarchy a t  center stage. 
6 0 n e  might think tha t ,  since the  Laws speak in  t h e  past  tense 
when establishing the parent-child analogy (Cr .  50e-5la), a n  adult  
child is on equal footing with his parents. But the use of the past tense 
seems simply to be for emphasis, perhaps because a young child has a 
greater inequality of rights with his parents, which would make tha t  
relationship more l ike t h a t  between citizen and  s ta te .  Socrates’ 
incredulity a t  Euthyphro’s prosecution of his  fa ther  (Euth .  4a-c) 
suggests t h a t  Socrates thinks t h a t  even a n  adult  child still  has  a n  
unequal relationship with his parents. 
Wade appeals to  t h e  moral hierarchy i n  order to resolve t h e  
second problem. He does not explain why obeying the greater superior 
does not injure the state, however (Wade 1971, 320, 323-24). 
Many t h a n k s  to John  Robertson for helpful comments on a n  
earlier draft of this paper. 
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